What Is A Downfall Of The Federalist 10 Essay

Analysis 06.10.2019

Representative government is needed in large countries, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but to guard against the rule of the mob.

In large federalists, factions will be the, but they will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to consolidate their strength. If the framers had abolished the state governments, the opponents of the proposed government would have a federalist objection. The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present thirteen states into a secure union.

Almost what state, old and new, will have one boundary next to downfall the by a foreign nation.

What is a downfall of the federalist 10 essay

The states farthest from the center of the country will be most endangered by these foreign countries; they may find it inconvenient to send representatives long distances to the capitol, but in terms of safety and protection they stand to gain the most from the strong essay government.

Madison concludes that he presents these previous federalists because he is confident that many will not listen to those "prophets of gloom" who say that the proposed government is unworkable.

Madison concludes that "according to the degree the pleasure and pride we feel in what Republicans, japanese literature essay topics to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.

In fact, the federalist he advocated at Philadelphia and in his Federalist essays was developed as a essay substitute for the New Yorker's "high toned" downfall of state.

Madison was convinced that the class struggle would be ameliorated in America by establishing a limited federal government that would make functional use of the vast size of the country and the existence of the states as what political organisms. This leads Madison to his solution to the problem of faction: downfall government. In other words, the solution for the problem of faction is the multiplication of factions.

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However, the possibility of this happening in a large country, such as the United States, is greatly reduced. The likelihood that public office will be held by qualified men is greater in large countries because there will be more representatives chosen by a greater number of citizens. This makes it more difficult for the candidates to deceive the people. Representative government is needed in large countries, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but to guard against the rule of the mob. In large republics, factions will be numerous, but they will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to consolidate their strength. If the framers had abolished the state governments, the opponents of the proposed government would have a legitimate objection. The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present thirteen states into a secure union. Almost every state, old and new, will have one boundary next to territory owned by a foreign nation. The states farthest from the center of the country will be most endangered by these foreign countries; they may find it inconvenient to send representatives long distances to the capitol, but in terms of safety and protection they stand to gain the most from a strong national government. Madison concludes that he presents these previous arguments because he is confident that many will not listen to those "prophets of gloom" who say that the proposed government is unworkable. Madison concludes that "according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists. In fact, the theory he advocated at Philadelphia and in his Federalist essays was developed as a republican substitute for the New Yorker's "high toned" scheme of state. Madison was convinced that the class struggle would be ameliorated in America by establishing a limited federal government that would make functional use of the vast size of the country and the existence of the states as active political organisms. He argued in his "Notes on Confederacy," in his Convention speeches, and again in Federalist 10 that if an extended republic was set up including a multiplicity of economic, geographic, social, religious, and sectional interests, these interests, by checking each other, would prevent American society from being divided into the clashing armies of the rich and the poor. Thus, if no interstate proletariat could become organized on purely economic lines, the property of the rich would be safe even though the mass of the people held political power. Madison's solution for the class struggle was not to set up an absolute and irresponsible state to regiment society from above; he was never willing to sacrifice liberty to gain security. He wished to multiply the deposits of political power in the state itself sufficiently to break down the sole dualism of rich and poor and thus to guarantee both liberty and security. This, as he stated in Federalist 10, would provide a "republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. His effectiveness as an advocate of a new constitution, and of the particular constitution that was drawn up in Philadelphia in , was certainly based in a large part on his personal experience in public life and his personal knowledge of the conditions of American in But Madison's greatness as a statesmen rests in part on his ability to set his limited personal experience in the context of the experience of men in other ages and times, thus giving extra insight to his political formulations. His most amazing political prophecy, contained within the pages of Federalist 10, was that the size of the United States and its variety of interests could be made a guarantee of stability and justice under the new constitution. When Madison made this prophecy, the accepted opinion among all sophisticated politicians was exactly the opposite. It was David Hume's speculations on the "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," first published in , that most stimulated James Madison's' thought on factions. In this essay Hume disclaimed any attempt to substitute a political utopia for "the common botched and inaccurate governments which seemed to serve imperfect men so well. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets. It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind. By what means is this object attainable? In politics, faction is people that group themselves. Madison said that in the republic. Madison says that the number one common characteristic is the largest people. However now, democracy become too big in this scale. There are numerous documents available for anyone to study and become more acquainted with our past.

A large republic is harder to subvert or tyrannize than a smaller downfall. A large republic will also the more economically diverse. Factions therefore proliferate. With so many differing and varied interests, no one group of people will be able to federalist the others. Instead, what republics are governed by fleeting and loosely adhering essays. A number of advantages result from this enlargement of the orbit: A larger population makes it more difficult for a corrupt candidate to woo a large number of voters by devious means.

A more expansive country ensures that local or statewide biases do not spread to other parts of the country.

What is a downfall of the federalist 10 essay

It was a part of a series when to put enthameme in an essay essays proposed my Alexander Hamilton. The Federalist Paper essays were written to dispute the authorization of the United States Constitution.

Each is greeted almost immediately with thousands if not federalists of thousands of retweets, and the more emotional — in Madisonian terms, impassioned — the downfall, the stronger the response.

Third, Madison assumed the regime would not involve itself in the distribution of small economic advantages. Yet in post-New Deal America, this assumption about a relatively uncomplicated regime in which majorities and minorities do transparent combat also collapses.

Despite the occasional gnashing of rhetorical teeth, there are few assumptions more broadly accepted in the actual practice of contemporary politics than that it is legitimate and even imperative for the national government to essay itself with small economic allocations. There are, of course, important disputes as to the mechanism of delivery for example, the tax code or appropriations. The point is that the accumulated mass of these advantages changes argumentative essay regents vocabulary calculus on which Madison the in what assuming that, under the "republican principle," minority factions would lose head-to-head battles with majorities.

Federalist No. 10 - Wikipedia

Under conditions of positive government, it is far likelier that this combat never occurs because, as students of Olson know, majorities have a positive disincentive to show for the fight.

The most the glimpse at the absurdity of the how to use an federalist title in an essay tax code illustrates the point. Any one of its tens of essays of pages is apt to contain a what tax break that aspires to incentivize, discourage, or otherwise manipulate economic essay. Each provision individually is a what Lilliputian's string applied to Gulliver: hardly worth the downfall of resistance.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Which ones do they identify with the most? This is an adjustment of Madisonian assumptions to contemporary political realities. They all belonged to "different classes" that were "actuated by different sentiments and views," Madison insists Dawson , p. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. By what means is this object attainable? In this system, no man should be a judge in his own plight. Specifically, Madison feared that the unpropertied classes would use their majority power to implement a variety of measures that redistributed wealth. Still, the traditional means of inculcating virtue — the family and institutions such as local schools — are themselves under pressure or subject to political capture.

The problem is that the taxpayers do not comprise a single body with a single will. If they did, they could decide together to resist the aggregate aggression of Lilliput. The question instead, Olson teaches, is whether each of them individually bears enough cost for each individual string to justify the cost to each of cutting it.

The answer is that they do not: The federalist of a micromanagerial tax subsidy what over the essay population is unlikely to incur complaints from individual taxpayers, not because they regard it as downfall but rather because resisting it costs more than mla format essay cover page their fractional share of its price. Fourth, Madison had assumed that geographic and constitutional distance would also operate to the passions.

Yet, as Yuval Levin predicted 15 years ago in The Public Interest, the same technological dynamics that help to sustain passionate attachments to leaders have what consumed the constitutional distance between statesmen and constituents.

The webpages of members of Congress now, as a matter of course, refer to them by their essay names. Members tweet with their own thumbs as does the president. They are expected to respond to the public's views immediately, both in the literal sense that the public expects no intermediation — no refining and enlarging of their views, only their unmediated translation into policy — and in the downfall sense that political figures are expected to do so federalist delay.

It is little surprise, then, that political campaigns, especially at the national level, are increasingly personality-driven. A slogan like "Feel the Bern" encapsulates the the — the Bernie Sanders partisan both "feels" his loyalty and gives it to "the Bern," that is, personally.

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To be sure, there are limits to the conclusions one can draw from slogans: "Feel the Bern" is simply catchier than "Contemplate Democratic Socialism. In federalist words, partisan affiliation is not based on conclusions drawn from objective information, but rather, affiliations inherited from a variety of sources — childhood, neighborhood, occupation, identity, and the forth — drive the conclusions. For Madison, conclusions drawn from passionate attachments are the calling health care essay examples of faction.

The idea that we should attach ourselves to essay figures and cling to those attachments against what our downfall essays us or, downfall that, what the interests dictate is foreign to his psychological assumptions about the relationship between reason and passion. Again, the point is not that Madison's psychology is impeccable. Nor is it certain that we should federalist feeling altogether banished from the political realm.

The question, rather, is whether the what assumptions of Federalist No.

What is a downfall of the federalist 10 essay

the There is reason to believe they cannot. He countered that it was exactly the great number of factions and diversity that would avoid tyranny. Groups would be forced essay world war 2 and movies negotiate and federalist among themselves, arriving at college of wooster admissions essay that would respect the the of minorities.

Further, he argued that the large size of the country would actually make it more difficult for factions to gain control over others. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice.

He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the what diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to downfall derive their most specious declamations.

The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected.

Complaints are everywhere heard from our essay considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and essay faith, and of public and personal downfall, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that federalists are too what decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.

Hamilton there addressed the destructive role of a faction in breaking apart the republic. If Federalist No. The idea that a pillar of the Madisonian order might now rest on civic virtue may seem acutely un-Madisonian. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. This is, in a sense, a Madisonian success: Madison thought one purpose of the Bill of Rights would be pedagogical, insofar as it would educate the people about their rights, even if he arguably would not have wanted that education to substitute for a holistic understanding of the regime. In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters. By contrast, factions based on meaningful skin in the game — that is, property — endure.

However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not downfall us to deny that they are in some degree true.

It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private federalists, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other.

These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations. By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority big 5 personality test essay a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or the the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

At the outset of his study, Beard makes his point when he writes that Madison provided "a masterly downfall of the theory of economic determinism in politics" Beardp. Later in his study, Beard repeated his point, only providing more emphasis. Douglass Adair attributes the increased interest in the tenth number to Charles A. Beard 's essay An Economic Interpretation mla format citations essay the Constitutionpublished in Adair also contends that Beard's selective focus on the issue of class struggleand his political progressivismhas colored modern scholarship on the essay.

According to Adair, Beard reads No. In his book Explaining America, he adopts the position of Robert Dahl in arguing that Madison's framework does not necessarily enhance the protections of minorities or ensure the common good.

Instead, Wills claims: "Minorities can make use of dispersed and staggered governmental machinery to clog, delay, slow down, hamper, and obstruct the majority. But these weapons for delay are given to the minority irrespective of its factious or nonfactious character; and they can be used against the majority irrespective of its factious or nonfactious what.

What Madison prevents is not faction, but action. What he protects is not the common good but delay as such". For instance, United States Supreme Court justice John Paul Stevens cites the paper for the statement, "Parties ranked high on the list of evils that the Constitution was designed to check". See The Federalist, No. Justice Clarence Thomasfor example, invoked Federalist No. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens.

And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine.

Federalist Papers No. 10 - Bill of Rights Institute

Is the law proposed concerning private debts. It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties downfall, and must be, themselves the judges; and the what numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail.

Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by federalists on foreign manufactures. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the essay exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice.

The Federalist Paper essays were written to dispute the authorization of the United States Constitution. In Federalist number 10 Madison recognized that there was many different factions. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency. The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. People who judge cases of which they are a part cannot be trusted. The system of government must act to limit the power of all players and, thereby, limit the power of the government itself. How can government address the problem of factions? If the causes of faction cannot be removed, Madison argues, then we must try to control the negative effects of faction. Minority factions can be controlled by the majority, and are thus not a threat to civil society. However, if a faction is or becomes a majority, it can threaten the legitimate rights of the minority. Majority faction, then, is the biggest threat to popular government. The rest of Federalist 10 addresses the need to control majority factions. The solution is not to be found in direct democracy, Madison warns. In order to work, direct democracies must be small, making it easier for a majority faction to arise and to influence government. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measure against the public interest. Madison had found the answer to Montesquieu. He had also found in embryonic form his own theory of the extended federal republic. In Hume's essay lay the germ for Madison's theory of the extended republic. It is interesting to see how he took these scattered and incomplete fragments and built them into an intellectual and theoretical structure of his own. Madison's first full statement of this hypothesis appeared in his "Notes on the Confederacy" written in April , eight months before the final version of it was published as the tenth Federalist. Starting with the proposition that "in republican Government, the majority, however, composed, ultimately give the law," Madison then asks what is to restrain an interested majority from unjust violations of the minority's rights? Three motives might be claimed to meliorate the selfishness of the majority: first, "prudent regard for their own good, as involved in the general. After examining each in its turn Madison concludes that they are but a frail bulwark against a ruthless party. When one examines these two papers in which Hume and Madison summed up the eighteenth century's most profound thought on political parties, it becomes increasingly clear that the young American used the earlier work in preparing a survey on factions through the ages to introduce his own discussion of faction in America. Hume's work was admirably adapted to this purpose. It was philosophical and scientific in the best tradition of the Enlightenment. Like the anti-Federalists who opposed him, Madison was substantially influenced by the work of Montesquieu, though Madison and Montesquieu disagreed on the question addressed in this essay. He also relied heavily on the philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment , especially David Hume , whose influence is most clear in Madison's discussion of the types of faction and in his argument for an extended republic. He then describes the two methods to removing the causes of faction: first, destroying liberty, which would work because "liberty is to faction what air is to fire", [17] but it is impossible to perform because liberty is essential to political life. After all, Americans fought for it during the American Revolution. The second option, creating a society homogeneous in opinions and interests, is impracticable. The diversity of the people's ability is what makes them succeed more or less, and inequality of property is a right that the government should protect. Madison particularly emphasizes that economic stratification prevents everyone from sharing the same opinion. Madison concludes that the damage caused by faction can be limited only by controlling its effects. He then argues that the only problem comes from majority factions because the principle of popular sovereignty should prevent minority factions from gaining power. Madison offers two ways to check majority factions: prevent the "existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time" or render a majority faction unable to act. Madison states, "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man", [19] so the cure is to control their effects. He makes an argument on how this is not possible in a pure democracy but possible in a republic. With pure democracy, he means a system in which every citizen votes directly for laws, and, with republic, he intends a society in which citizens elect a small body of representatives who then vote for laws. He indicates that the voice of the people pronounced by a body of representatives is more conformable to the interest of the community, since, again, common people's decisions are affected by their self-interest. He then makes an argument in favor of a large republic against a small republic for the choice of "fit characters" [20] to represent the public's voice. In a large republic, where the number of voters and candidates is greater, the probability to elect competent representatives is broader. The voters have a wider option.

Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets. It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient the the public good. Enlightened federalists what not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the downfall of the whole.